State of Utah v. Mark R. Thurston : Brief of Respondent by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1988
State of Utah v. Mark R. Thurston : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; Charlene Barlow; Assistant Attorney General; Attorney for
Respondent.
Kenneth R. Brown; Brown & Cox; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Utah v. Thurston, No. 880593 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1374




.A10 ^ <^ x JLN^THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DOCKET MO. S&&L 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
MARK R. THURSTON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 880593-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR TWO COUNTS OF 
DISTRIBUTION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, 
COCAINE, BOTH SECOND DEGREE FELONIES, IN 
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-
8(l)(a)(ii)(1986)(SUPP. 1988), IN THE SECOND 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR DAVIS 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS 
CORNABY, JUDGE, PRESIDING. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
CHARLENE BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
KENNETH R. BROWN 
BROWN & COX 
10 West 300 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Appellant 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 880593-CA 
v. j 
MARK R. THURSTON, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR TWO COUNTS OF 
DISTRIBUTION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, 
COCAINE, BOTH SECOND DEGREE FELONIES, IN 
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-
8(l)(a)(ii)(1986)(SUPP. 1988), IN THE SECOND 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR DAVIS 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS 
CORNABY, JUDGE, PRESIDING. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
CHARLENE BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
KENNETH R. BROWN 
BROWN & COX 
10 West 300 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 8 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
BY DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
HIS GUILTY PLEA BASED ON THE COURT'S DECISION 
THAT THE PROSECUTION HAD NOT VIOLATED ITS PLEA 
AGREEMENT 10 
A. Standard of Review for Denial of Motion 
to Withdraw Guilty Plea 10 
B. The Agreement of the Prosecutor Regarding 
a Sentencing Recommendation Did Not Bind, 
the Law Enforcement Agency 11 
C. The Law Enforcement Agency is Not a State 
Agency and Should Not Be Forestalled 
From Presenting Its Independent 
Recommendation 18 
POINT II DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA COULD NOT HAVE BEEN 
BASED ON REASONABLE RELIANCE ON A BELIEF 
THAT THE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY WAS BOUND 




TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Curry v. State, 513 So.2d 204 (Fla.App. 4 Dist. 1987) 12 
Farrar v. State, 52 Wis.2d 651, 191 N.W.2d 214 (1971) 16 
Lee v. State, 501 So.2d 591 (Fla. 1987) 11-12 
Ryan v. State, 479 N.E.2d 517 (Ind. 1985) 16 
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 
30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971) 21 
State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988) 20-21 
State v. Davis, 43 Wash.App. 832, 720 P.2d 454 (1986) 16 
State v. Forsyth, 560 P.2d 337 (Utah 1977) 10-11 
State v. Garfield, 552 P.2d 129 (Utah 1976) 10 
State v. Harris, 585 P.2d 450 (Utah 1978) 10 
State v. Kelly, 126 Ariz. 193, 613 P.2d 857 
(Ariz.App. 1980) 18 
State v. McFord, 115 Ariz. 246, 564 P.2d 935 (1977).. 13-14 
State v. Peterson, 29 Wash.App. 655, 630 P.2d 480(1981) 
aff'd 97 Wash.2d 864, 651 P.2d 211 (1982), appeal 
after remand 37 Wash.App. 309, 680 P.2d 445 (1984).. 14-15 
State v. Peterson, 37 Wash.App. 309, 680 P.2d 445 
(1984) 15 
State v. Peterson, 97 Wash.2d 864, 651 P.2d 211 (1982) 15 
State v. Plum, 15 Utah 2d 124, 378 P.2d 671 (1963)... 10 
State v. Roqel, 116 Ariz. 114, 568 P.2d 421 (1977)... 12-13 
State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785 (Utah 1984) 19 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-909 (1986) 2, 20 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-914 (1986) 2, 20 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-18-1 (1987) 2, 20 
Utah Code Ann. S 41-6-34 (1988) 2 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii)(1986)(Supp. 1988). 1-3 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv)(1986)(Supp. 1988). 2-3 
Utah Code Ann. § 64-13-20(1)(a) (1986) (Supp. 1988).. 2, 17 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1982) 2, 10 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(4) (1982) (Supp. 1988) 2, 17 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-2(f) (1987) (Supp. 1988) 1-2 
Utah Const, art. XI, § 5 2, 20 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11 4 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 880593-CA 
v. : 
MARK R. THURSTON, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction for two counts of 
Distribution of a Controlled Substance, Cocaine, both second 
degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-
8(l)(a)(ii) (1986) (Supp. 1988). This Court has jurisdiction to 
hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-2(f) (1987) (Supp. 
1988), because this appeal is from a district court criminal case 
involving felonies which are not first degree or capital. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether an agreement by a prosecutor to make a 
certain recommendation at sentencing binds the law enforcement 
agency in the case to the same recommendation, such that a 
different recommendation by a police officer constitutes a breach 
of the plea agreement. 
2. Whether defendant's claim that he relied on a 
belief that law enforcement was bound by the prosecutor's 
recommendation was reasonable and mandates a withdrawal of his 
guilty plea, given that he was not misled into that belief by the 
prosecutor or by case law. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
For purposes of this brief, respondent relies on the 
following provisions: 
1. Constitution of Utah, Art. XI, § 5, 
2. Utah Code Ann. S 10-3-909 (1986), 
3. Utah Code Ann. S 10-3-914 (1986), 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 17-18-1 (1987), 
5. Utah Code Ann. S 41-6-34 (1988), 
6. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1986) (Supp. 
1988), 
7. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (1986) (Supp. 
8. Utah Code Ann. S 64-13-20(1)(a) (1986) (Supp. 
9. Utah Code Ann. S 77-13-6 (1982), 
10. Utah Code Ann. S 77-18-1(4) (1982) (Supp. 1988), 
11. Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-2(f) (1987) (Supp. 1988). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On February 23, 1988, defendant was charged with two 
counts of Distribution of a Controlled Substance, Cocaine, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. $ 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1986) (Supp. 
1988) and Failure to Report an Accident, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. S 41-6-34 (1988) (Record for District Court case no. 




was charged with Distribution of a Controlled Substance, Cocaine, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii), and 
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, 
Cocaine, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) 
(1986) (Supp. 1988) (Record for District Court case no. 5997 
[hereinafter R. 5997] at 9-10). Defendant appeared for a change 
of plea on August 17, 1988, in the Second Judicial District 
Court, in and for Davis County, the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, 
presiding (R. 31). Pursuant to plea negotiations, defendant pled 
guilty to the two counts of Distribution of a Controlled 
Substance in District Court case no. 5995, and the State moved to 
dismiss the Failure to Report an Accident charge in that case and 
the two controlled substance charges in District Court case no. 
5997 (R. at 31). 
Defendant was sentenced on September 13, 1988, to an 
indeterminate term of one to fifteen years in the Utah State 
Prison on each count, with the sentences to run concurrently, and 
was ordered to pay restitution to Metro Narcotics Strike Force 
and to Bountiful Motors (R. at 32). Defendant filed a Motion to 
Withdraw Guilty Plea or in the Alternative for Re-sentencing, on 
September 15, 1988 (R. at 33). At a hearing on that motion, the 
prosecutor and the defense attorney offered to stipulate that 
defendant could be resentenced with a different presentence 
report and by a different judge. The court did not accept the 
stipulation and, after hearing argument, took the motion to 
withdraw plea under advisement (R. at 46). After review of the 
motion and accompanying memorandum, the court denied the motion 
-*« 
in a Ruling signed October 7, 1988. Notice of Appeal was filed 
by defendant on October 17, 1988 (R. at 109). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant was charged in two Informations with three 
counts of Distribution of Cocaine, one count of Possession of 
Cocaine with Intent to Distribute, and one count of Failure to 
Report an Accident. Pursuant to plea negotiations, defendant 
pled guilty to two counts of Distribution of Cocaine (Transcript 
of Change of Plea hearing [hereinafter T.COP] at 2-3). In 
return, the prosecutor agreed to move to dismiss the other counts 
and to recommend probation for defendant at the time of 
sentencing (T.COP at 2-3). At the change of plea hearing, the 
trial court questioned defendant extensively about his 
understanding of the consequences of his guilty pleas. Defendant 
does not now allege that the his plea was involuntary because the 
requirements of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
were not met. 
Regarding the recommendation of the prosecutor, the 
trial court carefully explained that the court was not bound by 
those recommendations. The questioning went as follows: 
THE COURT: Now, I know what the 
recommendations of counsel are going to be, 
because this is a first offense, there be no 
sentence imposed. Court almost always asks 
for a pre-sentence report so I can find out 
more information about the individual, but 
you have no promises on sentencing at the 
time of entering a plea. Do you understand 
that? 
MR. THURSTON: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: If at the time of sentencing 
the Court thought it was appropriate, it 
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could enter the maximum. Do you understand 
that? 
MR. THURSTON: Yes, I do. 
(T.COP at 5-6). 
At the time of sentencing on September 13, 1988, 
defendant's counsel expressed dissatisfaction with the 
presentence report which had been prepared by the Department of 
Adult Probation and Parole (Transcript of sentencing hearing 
[hereinafter T.Sen.] at 2). Defense counsel specifically 
complained that the State had promised to recommend probation but 
the law enforcement agency recommended prison (T.Sen. at 3). Mr. 
Brown argued that he felt the recommendation of the Department of 
Adult Probation and Parole was unduly influenced by the law 
enforcement recommendation (T.Sen. at 3-5). He also argued that 
defendant should be placed on probation with an intensive drug 
treatment program or county jail time (T.Sen. at 5). 
In response, the prosecutor reiterated the 
recommendation of the County Attorney's Office, which 
recommendation had been agreed to by a different Deputy County 
Attorney (T.Sen. at 5-6). Mr. Harward argued that the former 
prosecutor had bound himself and the County Attorney's Office to 
that recommendation but did not bind law enforcement nor the 
Department of Adult Probation and Parole (T.Sen. at 5-6). Mr. 
Harward also drew it to the court's attention that, had there 
been a victim in this case, the prosecutor's recommendation would 
not have bound that victim; the victim could have made any 
recommendation that he or she felt was proper (T.Sen. at 6). 
After further argument (T.Sen. at 6-8), the court said: 
The Court is impressed by what the 
recommendations of the police officer are. I 
don't see — I know what you're saying, 
Counsel. I don't see the necessity of the 
State binding a police plea so they can't be 
honest in what they think ought to be in a 
case. If it's going to be the other way, 
then they ought to have the input before they 
make any negotiation with them. It ought to 
be a part of the negotiation. 
I don't — never interpreted it that way. 
I always interpreted it that their office 
makes the recommendation, that everybody else 
in the process has the right to honestly make 
their own statement what they believe it is. 
There are times when police — In fact, I 
think more often police would recommend 
prison when many times we don't impose 
prison. Because on a general run of it, I 
think they have tendency to be a little more 
harsh than perhaps the average person in 
dealing with it because of their constant 
involvement. I think, though, that they and 
the victims and A.P.&.P. [sic] and anybody 
else that's involved in the process ought to 
be able to honestly say what they think. 
(T.Sen. at 8-9). The court went on to say that it believed that 
the recommendations of the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole were appropriate because defendant had been in a drug 
treatment program and did not follow up on it and had immediately 
been involved in the sale of drugs after he got out of the 
program (T.Sen. at 9-10). The court was not impressed with the 
apparent decision of defendant that he would not use drugs but 
that he didn't mind selling them to others (T.Sen. at 10). The 
court also based its sentencing decision on the claim that 
defendant had threatened a witness in the case (T.Sen* at 10). 
After hearing further argument from defense counsel, 
the court ordered defendant to prison (T.Sen. at 11-12). 
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Two weeks later, on September 27, 1988, a hearing was 
held on defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea or to be 
resentenced (Transcript of Motion hearing [hereinafter T.Mot.] at 
4). At that hearing, the prosecution and defendant attempted to 
enter into a stipulation that defendant could be resentenced by a 
different judge and with a new presentence report by a different 
probation agent (T.Mot. at 3-4). The court rejected that 
stipulation and heard argument on the motion to withdraw plea 
(T.Mot. at 4). Defendant's argument was basically the same 
argument that he makes on appeal. The prosecutor said that the 
County Attorney's Office never attempted to bind the police 
officers in their recommendation but did not oppose the 
withdrawal of plea and a subsequent trial (T.Mot. at 7). The 
court asked defense counsel as to the extent that the 
prosecutor's agreement bound other State agencies, such as the 
Department of Adult Probation and Parole, or witnesses and 
victims (T.Mot. at 8 and 10). Mr. Brown conceded that the 
Department was not bound, nor was the court, and argued that 
victims' statements fall into a different category (T.Mot. at 8-
10). Mr. Brown argued that the "State" was bound by the 
agreement and that the law enforcement agency should be 
considered part of the State in that agreement (T.Mot. at 10). 
The court denied the motion to withdraw in a written 
ruling signed October 7, 1988 (R. at 47-49). The court said: 
Prosecutors and police must normally work 
as a team if there is ever to be a conviction 
of a crime. This is not to say that they 
must agree on everything. A prosecutor 
should consult with police before entering 
into a plea bargain. If police are not 
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consulted it does not follow that the 
defendant can be deprived of his plea 
bargain. By the same token, there is no 
necessity for them to agree on sentencing 
recommendation. It is enough that the 
prosecutor is consistent with the plea 
bargain. In this case the prosecutor never 
varied from his commitment to recommend 
probation. 
A red flag should go up as to how far the 
principle encouraged by the defense would be 
carried. Is it limited to the officers 
directly involved in the case or all officers 
who have some knowledge concerning the case 
or the defendant? Does it include all police 
agencies? Does it include probation 
officers? Does it include undercover agents 
who are not police officers? Does it include 
victims? The defense argues that it would 
only include the officers involved in the 
case, but that is because they are the only 
ones he now has a case against. 
Sentencing is a judicial function. Every 
person should be intelligently sentenced, 
that is, sentenced after the court is made 
aware of all available information. No one 
should be muzzled in providing information or 
recommendations to the court unless they have 
specifically agreed to be so bound. The 
court frequently receives sentencing 
recommendations from prosecutors, police, 
health professionals, family, victims, social 
groups, and a myriad of others. The court is 
sentencing in 6pite of some recommendation to 
the contrary in almost every case. The court 
has the right to hear from the police and all 
others. 
(R. at 48-49). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The law enforcement agency involved in this case was 
not bound by the agreement for a sentencing recommendation made 
by the prosecutor. The State cannot bind the police agency 
because the State does not have the authority to do so. To hold 
that the law enforcement agency cannot give the Department of 
Adult Probation and Parole a different recommendation than the 
8-
prosecutor's is to nullify the guidelines of that department for 
writing presentence reports. Those guidelines specify that the 
presentence writer is to contact the law enforcement agency and 
include any recommendations that they have. 
While there is no Utah case law, and little from other 
jurisdictions, on the issue of whether a law enforcement agency 
is bound by the prosecutor's plea bargain, the majority of the 
jurisdictions have held that the agency is not bound. Because 
police officers have no authority to direct a plea agreement, 
they should not be bound by an agreement in which they had little 
input. 
Defendant's alleged reliance on a mistaken belief that 
the prosecutor's promise bound the police officer was not 
reasonable. There is no evidence that the prosecutor misled 
defendant into this "misunderstanding" and there is nothing in 
Utah law which supports such a belief. Since defendant cannot 
show that his understanding of the agreement was induced by the 
prosecutor or was based on law, he cannot claim that his 
"reliance" on this belief was reasonable. If the reliance was 
not reasonable, defendant is not entitled to withdraw his plea on 





THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
BY DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS 
GUILTY PLEA BASED ON THE COURT'S DECISION 
THAT THE PROSECUTION HAD NOT VIOLATED ITS 
PLEA AGREEMENT. 
A. Standard of Review for Denial of Motion 
to Withdraw Guilty Plea. 
Defendant apparently argues that the trial court abused 
its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea 
because, he alleges, the State breached the plea agreement 
reached with defendant• Defendant also claims that the State's 
promise was illusory and thus defendant's guilty plea was 
involuntary. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1982) provides that a plea of 
guilty may be withdrawn as follows: 
Withdrawal of Plea. A plea of not guilty may 
be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
A plea of guilty or no contest may be 
withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with 
leave of court. 
Id. Accordingly, a criminal defendant may not withdraw a guilty 
plea as a matter of right, but only upon a showing of Mgood 
cause." State v. Plum, 15 Utah 2d 124, 378 P.2d 671 (1963); 
State v. Harris, 585 P.2d 450 (Utah 1978). A motion to withdraw 
a guilty plea is addressed to the trial court's discretion. 
State v. Forsyth, 560 P.2d 337 (Utah 1977); State v. Garfield, 
552 P.2d 129 (Utah 1976). As in all discretionary matters, given 
the trial judge's prerogatives as well as his advantaged 
position, reviewing courts accord considerable latitude to the 
trial court's discretion and will not interfere "unless it 
plainly appears that there was abuse thereof." Forsyth, 560 P.2d 
at 339 (footnote omitted). 
B. The Agreement of the Prosecutor Regarding 
a Sentencing Recommendation Did Not Bind 
the Law Enforcement Agency. 
The main thrust of defendant's argument at the hearing 
on the motion to withdraw and on appeal is that the agreement 
reached between defendant and the prosecutor regarding a 
sentencing recommendation bound the law enforcement agency to the 
same recommendation in the presentence report. There are no Utah 
appellate cases addressing this issue but research has disclosed 
other jurisdictions which have answered, or at least touched on, 
this question. 
Three jurisdictions have specifically addressed the 
recommendation of law enforcement in a presentence report which 
differs from the bargained recommendation of the prosecutor. 
Intermediate Florida appellate courts differed in their treatment 
of this issue until the Florida Supreme Court resolved the 
question for that state in Lee v. State, 501 So.2d 591 (Fla. 
1987). Prior to that case, the Fourth District Court of Appeals 
had ruled that a law enforcement officer could make an 
independent recommendation to the court; the Florida First 
District Court of Appeals had ruled the opposite. In Lee, the 
Florida Supreme Court held that a state law enforcement agency 
was bound by the agreement made by the state attorney's office 
under a rule of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure which 
stated that the prosecuting attorney represented the state in all 
plea negotiations. Lee, 501 So.2d at 593. Respondent has found 
no other jurisdictions which have followed this holding and will 
argue below in this brief that this Florida case is not congruent 
with state policy in Utah. 
In an analogous case, the Florida Fourth District Court 
of Appeals reversed a conviction on a no contest plea because a 
probation officer in a presentence report had recommended a 
sentence which differed from the plea agreement entered into by 
the State. In Curry v. State, 513 So.2d 204 (Fla.App. 4 Dist. 
1987), the intermediate appellate court found that the State had 
entered into the agreement and had represented that law 
enforcement and the victim's parents (the charge was one of lewd 
and lascivious assault on a child) agreed with the proposed 
disposition. However, the presentence report from the "Parole 
and Probation Commission" contained a recommendation from the 
probation officer which was greater than that agreed on by the 
State. The appellate court held that that was good cause to 
allow the withdrawal of the plea. Respondent asserts that this 
case makes it amply clear that Utah should not follow the lead of 
Florida cases on this issue. 
Other states have ruled that law enforcement officers 
are not bound by the plea bargain. In State v. Rogel, 116 Ariz. 
114, 568 P.2d 421 (1977), the Supreme Court of Arizona held that 
Rogel had waived objection to a police officer giving a different 
recommendation by not preserving the issue for appeal. The court 
went on to address the merits of the issue. It said: 
Appellant also argues that the State 
failed to comply with the terms of the plea 
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agreement. The written agreement provided 
that the appellant would plead guilty to the 
two counts of burglary and one count of rape 
in return for the State's dismissal of a 
pending charge of assault with intent to 
commit rape. The agreement further provided 
that "the State" would make no recommendation 
whatsoever on sentencing. He argues that 
this latter promise was broken because the 
presentence report filed with the court 
contained a statement by Detective Moreno, 
the investigating officer, to the effect that 
the appellant should receive a lengthy 
sentence. 
. . . 
. . . [Considering the merits of the 
argument, we find that the agreement was not 
breached. Plea agreements are entered into 
by the defendant, who is usually represented 
by counsel, and the prosecution. The police 
participate in neither negotiations nor the 
agreement and have no voice in dictating what 
terms should be considered, bargained for or 
included. As such, we think it is evident 
that in entering a plea agreement containing 
provisions requiring certain conduct by "the 
State," it is the parties' mutual intent to 
use that term in referring only to the 
prosecutorial branch of the State. The 
provision requiring the State to stand mute 
on sentencing here obviously refers to and 
binds only the county prosecutor and was not 
intended to prohibit police officers from 
airing their opinions when specifically asked 
to do so by probation officers. Hence, the 
plea agreement was not breached. 
Rogel, 568 P.2d at 423. 
Another Arizona case did not specifically address this 
issue but arrived at similar conclusion. In State v. McFord, 115 
Ariz. 246, 564 P.2d 935 (1977), the prosecutor had agreed that, 
in return for a plea of guilty to second degree murder, the 
••State of Arizona" would try to persuade the Department of 
Corrections to allow defendant to serve his sentence in an 
institution other than the Arizona State Prison. The prosecutor 
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contacted the Department and complied with the agreement but the 
Department did not transfer the defendant to another facility. 
McFord claimed error, saying that the Department was bound by the 
agreement entered into by the prosecutor in the name of the 
State. The Court of Appeals stated: 
It is clear that the reference to "the State 
of Arizona" must be read to mean the Coconino 
County Attorney, whose office filed the 
charges for and on behalf of "the State of 
Arizona." 
McFord, 564 P.2d at 937. The court held that the Department of 
Corrections was not bound and that no breach occurred. It said: 
. . . we can find nothing in [the testimony] 
which would compel the trial court to find 
that McFord had been misled as to his chances 
for out-of-state transfer. 
. . . 
In conclusion, . . . McFord did not get 
what he hoped for# but he received what he 
was promised. 
McFord, 564 P.2d at 938. It is clear that Arizona has determined 
that the prosecutor binds only his own office when he enters into 
a plea agreement. No other state or non-state entities are bound 
by the agreement. 
The Washington Court of Appeals has also held, in a 
similar case, that a prosecutor had not breached the plea 
agreement. In State v. Peterson, 29 Wash.App. 655, 630 P.2d 480 
(1981), aff'd 97 Wash.2d 864, 651 P.2d 211 (1982), appeal after 
remand 37 Wash.App. 309, 680 P.2d 445 (1984), the trial court and 
the Court of Appeals were told of the prosecutor's recommendation 
for no jail time, probation, and conditions of probation being 
left -open to the Court." Peterson, 630 P.2d 481. At the 
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sentencing hearing, the trial court asked the police officer, who 
had been the victim of the assault charged in that case, for his 
sentencing recommendation. The officer recommended sixty days in 
jail. The defense attorney asked the court to allow the 
prosecutor to explain why he had entered into the plea agreement 
but the court denied the request, stating that the prosecutor was 
bound by his commitment. Peterson, 630 P.2d at 481-82. The 
intermediate appellate court held that the prosecutor had not 
breached his agreement, but that the trial court had erred in 
preventing the prosecutor from explaining the reasons for the 
plea bargain when it was defendant who had asked that the 
explanation be allowed. Peterson, 630 P.2d at 483. 
This decision was appealed to the Washington Supreme 
Court which upheld the remand by the intermediate court. State 
v. Peterson, 97 Wash.2d 864, 651 P.2d 211 (1982). On remand, the 
prosecutor was allowed to state his reasons for the plea bargain 
and the sentence was the same as originally. Peterson again 
appealed, complaining that the prosecutor had not appropriately 
advocated the plea bargain. The intermediate court held that the 
agreement had not been breached because the prosecutor had kept 
his bargain and recommended it to two judges. The defendant 
asked the prosecutor to explain his agreement and was told that 
he did so at his own risk and was warned that the explanation 
might not be favorable to him. When it was not, he could not 
then withdraw his guilty plea. State v. Peterson, 37 Wash.App. 
309, 680 P.2d 445 (1984). While the issue of the recommendation 
of the police officer was not central to these decisions, it is 
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clear that the bargain entered into by the prosecutor did not 
bind the officer. 
Wisconsin has also held that only the prosecutor's 
office is bound by plea negotiations. In Farrar v. State, 52 
Wis.2d 651, 191 N.W.2d 214 (1971), the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
stated: 
The Wisconsin cases dealing with bargained 
pleas assume that the bargainers are the 
district attorney, the defendant and the 
defendant's attorney, and no one else. 
Farrar, 191 N.W.2d at 217. The court elaborated that even non-
prosecution personnel such as parole officers, law officers, or 
witnesses who were present at negotiations, and who may have even 
made statements during the negotiations, do not thereby become 
parties to the plea bargain. 
Other courts have held that asking, or allowing, a 
victim or victim's family, or other witnesses, to speak regarding 
sentencing is not a violation of the prosecutor's plea agreement. 
See Ryan v. State, 479 N.E.2d 517 (Ind. 1985) (victim's mother 
asked for maximum sentence); and State v. Davis, 43 Wash.App. 
832, 720 P.2d 454 (1986) ("The trial judge had the right to be 
apprised of all of the facts and the prosecutor did not breach 
the agreement by informing the court of the two witnesses' 
[probation officer and police officer] concern and their wish to 
testify.") 
Respondent asserts that the stance taken by Arizona, 
Washington, Wisconsin and Indiana is the appropriate direction 
for the law in Utah. Defendant even argued at his sentencing and 
the hearing on his motion that he only sought to bind the law 
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enforcement agency to the agreement made by the prosecutor. As 
respondent asserts later in this brief, the law enforcement 
agency in this case is not a state agency and other state 
agencies such as Adult Probation and Parole should be bound 
before the law enforcement agency is, if any agency is to be 
bound at all. It is the State's position that the plea agreement 
entered into by the prosecutor binds only the prosecutor's 
office. As the Arizona court stated in Rogel, police 
participation in plea negotiations is minimal and has no binding 
effect on the prosecutor. Police officers may make their 
recommendations to the prosecutor regarding plea agreements but 
the officer cannot control the agreement being made. It is the 
prosecutor's prerogative to negotiate and the prosecutor can 
ignore the input of police officers if he or she so desires. 
Respondent maintains that the public policy 
considerations come down on the side of allowing police officers 
to present their sentencing recommendations freely to the 
presentence investigator. As required by the Presentence 
Investigation Report Manual (the pertinent portion of which is 
included as Addendum A), a presentence writer must interview a 
representative of the arresting agency and include, inter alia, 
"the arresting officer's sentencing recommendation if he/she has 
one." (Presentence Investigation Report Manual at 9, see 
Addendum A). This Manual was prepared at the instance of the 
judicial system and has been accepted and approved for use by the 
Department of Adult Probation and Parole. Authority for such 
guidelines and a presentence report comes from Utah Code Ann. $ 
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64-13-20(1)(a) (1986) (Supp. 1988) and Utah Code Ann. S 77-18-
1(4) (1982) (Supp. 1988). Such a direction to the presentence 
writer to include the officer's recommendation would be 
meaningless if the officer was bound to recommend only what the 
prosecution agreed to in negotiations. As the Arizona Court of 
Appeals said in State v. Kelly# 126 Ariz. 193, 613 P.2d 857 
(Ariz.App. 1980): 
One of the most important elements of the 
criminal justice system is just and informed 
sentencing by a trial court furnished with 
all relevant sentencing data. In our 
opinion, a plea agreement which prevents this 
is detrimental to society and a fraud on the 
court. 
Kelly, 613 P.2d at 860. The unfettered recommendation of the 
arresting officer is "relevant sentencing data" which a trial 
court ought to have in order to fashion an informed sentence. 
C. The Law Enforcement Agency is Not a State 
Agency and Should Not Be Forestalled 
From Presenting Its Independent 
Recommendation. 
Defendant argues that the police officer should be 
treated as an extension of the State and thus be bound by the 
recommendation of the prosecutor. He cites as his authority a 
case involving discovery violations in which the officer was 
considered part of the "prosecution team" for purposes of 
providing information under the rules of discovery. That case is 
not applicable to the circumstance now before this Court. 
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State v, Shabata, 678 P.2d 785 (Utah 1984), stands for 
the proposition that: 
[information known to police officers 
working on a case is charged to the 
prosecution since the officers are part of 
the prosecution team, . . . Neither the 
prosecutor nor officers working on a case may 
withhold exculpatory evidence or evidence 
valuable to a defendant. 
Shabata, 678 P.2d at 788 (citations omitted). The term 
Mprosecution team" should not be expanded to mean that an officer 
cannot express his own opinion as to what a sentence should be. 
Since it is the law enforcement agency which investigates a case 
and then presents it to a municipal or county attorney for 
authorization and prosecution, the existence of exculpatory or 
other evidence should not be withheld from the prosecution. The 
prosecutor has a duty under the discovery rules to provide 
certain evidence to a defendant and Shabata stands for the 
proposition that that duty cannot be avoided by not receiving the 
information from the law enforcement agency. 
The prosecutor does not have the same duty to speak for 
the law enforcement agency. As pointed out in the previous 
subpart, the separate recommendation of the law enforcement 
agency is sought by Adult Probation and Parole under guidelines 
authorized by the judicial system and by statute. There is no 
statute, similar to the discovery rule, which directs a 
prosecutor to make recommendations which bind the law enforcement 
agencies. The decision in Shabata should not be extended to the 
lengths that defendant asks but should be limited to discovery 
situations. 
-it). 
The law enforcement agency in this matter is not a 
state agency and is not under the control of the state so the 
state prosecutor cannot speak on its behalf. The creation and 
control of police departments has been given to the governing 
bodies of cities of the first and second class. Constitution of 
Utah, Art. XI, S 5 and Utah Code Ann. S 10-3-909 (1986). The 
powers of a county attorney are listed in Utah Code Ann. S 17-18-
1 (1987) and do not include any authorization to direct or 
control police agencies. County attorneys are authorized to 
prosecute public offenses committed within their counties but not 
to control the activities of law enforcement agencies. The 
statutory duties of police officers are listed in Utah Code Ann. 
S 10-3-914 (1986) and do not mention any duty to follow the 
directions of a county attorney in investigating or pursuing a 
criminal case. Since the county attorney's office in the case 
now before the Court had no authority to direct or control the 
law enforcement agency, the office had no authority to bind the 
agency to a sentencing recommendation. Neither did the police 
agency have any statutory duty to obey the county attorney and be 
bound by his recommendation. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA COULD NOT HAVE BEEN 
BASED ON REASONABLE RELIANCE ON A BELIEF THAT 
THE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY WAS BOUND BY THE 
PROSECUTOR'S RECOMMENDATION ON SENTENCING. 
Defendant cites State v. Copeland# 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 
1988), for the proposition that he was misled by the promise of 
the prosecutor regarding his recommendation. Copeland does not 
dictate that this defendant should be allowed to withdraw his 
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plea. In that case, the defendant claimed that the promise of 
the State was illusory or misled him about the sentencing options 
available to the trial court. Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1274. In 
that case, the Supreme Court said that it was not clear "what 
recommendation the State promised to make." Ixi. That problem 
does not exist in the present case. Here, the prosecutor 
promised that he would recommend probation for defendant and he 
did so, both at the change of plea hearing and at the sentencing 
hearing (T.COP at 3 and T.Sen. at 6). In this case, a different 
prosecutor appeared at the sentencing hearing but he did not 
alter the plea agreement nor breach it. Based on that, 
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 
427 (1971), does not apply to this case. 
Defendant's claim that, as in Copeland, the 
prosecutor's promise was illusory is without merit. It was not a 
promise to recommend probation when probation was statutorily 
prohibited; it was a promise which could be carried out and had 
validity. Courts (and presentence writers) ask for the 
recommendation of the prosecutor and courts give that 
recommendation whatever weight the individual court feels is 
appropriate. As defendant admits, the trial court was not bound 
to follow the recommendation of the prosecutor, so defendant 
cannot now claim that he was misled as to whether the court would 
follow that recommendation. Indeed, the trial court made it very 
clear to defendant when he entered his guilty plea that the court 
was not bound by any recommendations. (T.COP at 5-6). 
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Since the promise made by the prosecutor was not 
illusory or without value, the question becomes whether defendant 
was misled as to what value the promise had. Defendant claims 
that he was misled because he thought that the promise bound the 
law enforcement agency to follow the recommendation of the 
prosecutor. This Court must decide whether defendant could have 
reasonably understood the promise to have had that meaning. As 
noted above, there is no Utah case law which addresses the 
specific issue of whether law enforcement is bound by the promise 
of a prosecutor. Law from other jurisdictions is meager as well, 
but preponderates on the side of the view that a prosecutor's 
promise does not bind law enforcement. The prosecutor in this 
case made no claim that law enforcement would concur with his 
recommendation and case law does not support that understanding. 
Defendant was not led by the prosecutor to believe that law 
enforcement was bound. He cannot claim that he was misled as 
Copeland might have been in his case. 
Since the prosecutor in the present case did not 
mislead defendant as to the value of his promise, the next 
question is whether a defendant's claim that he misunderstood 
what the promise was, even though he was not misled in his 
belief, warrants a withdrawal of his plea. Respondent asserts 
that it does not. A defendant could always claim that he 
misunderstood the promise when he received a sentence which he 
did not like. If he did not have to prove that he was led to 
that misunderstanding by the prosecutor, that bare allegation 
would force trial courts to allow withdrawal of guilty pleas. A 
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defendant could claim any number of misunderstandings which were 
not based on what really occurred, and, if not required to show 
that he was misled, he would have to be allowed to withdraw his 
plea* This would make a mockery of guilty pleas and allow 
"buyer's remorse" to rule over the law in this area. 
Defendant did not establish for the court below, and 
has not established for this Court, that he was misled about the 
promise made to him by the prosecutor. Just because he now 
claims that he misunderstood what the promise meant, this Court 
should not mandate the withdrawal of his voluntary plea. He has 
not shown that his "misunderstanding" was a reasonable one. The 
prosecutor did not promise him that law enforcement would follow 
the prosecutor's recommendation and defendant's so-called belief 
that the officer was bound is not based on the facts or the law. 
His unfounded "misunderstanding" does not dictate a reversal by 
this Court of the trial court's ruling. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, respondent respectfully 
requests that this Court affirm the jury's verdict of conviction 
in this case. 
jr 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this R ^ day of June, 1989. 




Assistant Attorney General 
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(25) PROSECUTOR'S STATEMENT: Contact the prosecuting attorney 
for his or her statement regarding the offender, the plea 
negotiations, the statue of the case, and sentencing 
recommendation. Tha prosecutor la often able to provide 
details about the offenac, the defendant, and tha victims 
that may not be in the file. The investigator may also 
find the prosecuting attorney haa written hia/her reasons 
for the plea negotiation and case settlement in the 
County Attorney file* In the prosecuting attorney's 
file, often there will be a section which contains 
sentencing recommendations, that should be checked for 
the prosecutor's written notes regarding the sentencing• 
Be as specific as possible and quote the prosecutor when 
possible. 
(26) DEFENSE ATTORNEY'S STATEMENT: Contact the defense 
attorney for his/her statement regarding the offender, 
plea negotiations, status of the case, and for sentencing 
recommendation. Request defense counsel to make a 
written statement and include verbatim in the report if 
they submit such a statement. 
(27) LAW ENFORCEMENT STATEMENT; Interview the arresting 
officer or en appropriate representative from the 
arresting agency for information regarding the arrest, 
the offender's attitude at the time of arrest, and the 
offender's cooperation since the time of the arrest. 
Additional information about the offense, documented 
criminal activity or pending investigations may also be 
included if law enforcement supplied it. Include the 
arresting officer's sentencing recommendation if he/she 
has one* 
PRIOR RECORD: 
(28) Juvenile: Include all entries in the juvenile record 
prior to the offender's eighteenth birthday(unless there 
is a duplication of referrals .) If no juvenile record 
existsi this fact should be documented. Obtain the 
juvenile record through the terminal operator. If 
necessary, additional information nay be obtained from 
the local office of the Juvenile Court by utilizing a 
signed release of information form. Local police records 
may also be utilised. Out of state juvenile records 
which are available should be utilized. Other states 
juvenile age parameters may differ from Utah and this 
difference should be noted. The agent should include 
offenses the offender admits which are not already 
listed. However, this information should be clearly 
identified as to its sources and the report should 
clearly reflect this information has not been documented. 
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